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ABSTRACT
The issue of irregular work has been well known in Italy since the early seven-
ties. Undeclared work is a particular facet of shadow economy where employers
evade tax typically by underreporting either the numbers of workers or the hours
worked or both and, by this mean, they avoid paying the legally due social se-
curity contributions. As any form of shadow activity, undeclared work introduces
important biases in the economic system. That is why, it is of paramount inter-
est for policy makers to understand which are the factors influencing undeclared
work. The Italian National Institute of Statistics has developed a methodology
in the vanguard to estimate the rate of irregular work and today we have time
series long enough for a review of the phenomenon. When looking at regional
rates of irregular work it’s stunning how dissimilar they are and this dissimilarity
is kept over time. This paper aims to understand the reasons of this heteroge-
neous dynamics and to identify it’s determinants, focusing in particular on the
role of social capital. We use a dynamic panel model to measure the impact
of social capital and of some other relevant variables on regional irregular work
rates. We find that social capital ha a significant effect. It reveals itself to be a
key factor in hindering the use of irregular workers.
Classification JEL: H26, C23, O17, J01.
Keywords: Social capital, Undeclared work, Arellano-Bond estimator, Dynamic
panel model .
1. INTRODUCTION
Shadow economy is the part of an economy which is not declared for tax and
that typically involves exchange of goods and services which are paid for in
cash. A lot of effects derive directly from shadow economy, mainly because it
introduces important biases on:
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1. Equity: similar situations are treated differently from a fiscal perspective;
2. Competition: those who don’t pay taxes have an advantage because they
reduce their costs;
3. Tax systems: to fund public expenditure, taxes are raised;
4. Size of important economic variables (GNP, growth, tax burden, unemploy-
ment, productivity).
Schneider (38) clearly states that there are many important reasons for the
Governments to be very concerned about the rise of the shadow economy. On
one hand, a growing shadow economy can be seen as the reaction of individuals
to tax burden and to the malfunctioning of institutions. In this case there might
be a vicious circle of a further increase in the budget deficit or tax rates, addi-
tional growth of the shadow economy, and gradual weakening of the economic
and social basis of collective arrangements. On the other hand shadow econ-
omy may attract (domestic and foreign) workers away from the official economy
and create an unfair competition for official firms. A positive effect of shadow
economy is that income earned is immediately spent in the official economy.
Moreover, theoretical knowledge on the dimension and on who is involved in
shadow activities is crucial to make an efficient allocation of resources to contrast
these irregular activities. In Schneider (39) it is argued that another side effect
is that if a country suffers from an increasing (or substantial) shadow economy,
policy makers base their decision on mistaken official indicators.
This brief discussion clarifies why it is of paramount interest for Governments
to decipher which are the key factors that influence underground activities.
Most of the studies on shadow economy and tax evasion date back to the
early seventies. The seminal work of Allingham-Sadmo (6) models tax evasion
as a portfolio choice: taxpayers decide to not comply if they evaluate that they
might have a monetary gain in evading. The gain depends on the amount of fines
they will have to pay if detected and on the probability of being detected. The
higher the expected punishment (given by the product of fines and the probability
of detection) the lower the tax evasion. The successive studies improved the
basic model.
Most literature identifies the following as determinants for tax evasion: tax
burden; people’s perception on the quality of public spending; tax complexity;
the credibility of fiscal authorities in collecting taxes.
Unfortunately at least one question remains with no answer: why, within
the same country, does there exist perceivably different levels of underground
economy? It suggests that there are some other factors that play a key role on
shadow economy and we strongly believe that social capital theory may be very
helpful.
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The effect of social capital on shadow economy has been explored by economists
only recently.
Kanniainen et al. (27) developed a model, tested on 21 OECD countries,
that explores the importance of moral sentiments on the control of underground
economy. The empirical analysis shows that the main determinants of shadow
economy are taxation and social security variables as well as tax morale.
Morality is seen as a particular form of social capitala, being a network good
shared by people belonging to the same community. Deviant behavior, being
socially stigmatized, is avoided by people especially if there is a high risk of
being detected. Therefore moral sentiments operate as a mechanism which
limits shadow activities.
Torgler (40; 41; 42) shows the existence of empirical evidence that reveals a
strong negative correlation between tax morale and shadow economy in United
States, Asia and Latin America. In Alm (7) the same relation is found for Russia.
One important facet of shadow economy is undeclared work, defined as (EU
definition) any paid activities that are lawful as regards their nature but not de-
clared to the public authorities, taking into account differences in the regulatory
systems of Member States. This definition excludes criminal activities and work
which does not have to be declared.
When we refer to undeclared work we are talking about a special form of
tax evasion perpetrated by employers. Sure enough employers have the re-
sponsibility of withholding the tax from the gross wages of all of their workers.
By underreportingb the real size of labor force to the social security authorities,
employers evade payment of the legally due social security contributions.
We focus our attention on undeclared work and in particular, on the role that
social capital has on preventing the use of irregular workers. To our knowledge
there is no study that investigates in depth the relationship between undeclared
work and social capital. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the literature by
filling this gap.
The mechanism through which social capital has an effect on undeclared
work is simple. When hiring a non regular worker, the employer knows that
he/she is risking being reported by the employee. The risk is comeasurably
harder to bear when the reference community of the employer condemn deviant
behavior.
Four main groups of undeclared workers can be identified:
1. persons with more than one job;
aAccording to the World Bank, social capital includes the institutions, the relationships, the
attitudes and values that govern interactions among people and contribute to economic and social
development. In section 2 there is a throughout discussion on social capital.
bThe evasion can be done in many different ways. Employers can declare the right number of
workers, but under report the hours worked or the position covered. An extreme form of underre-
porting occurs when employer completely hide to Fiscal authorities one or more workers.
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2. persons who are inactive (students, housewives, early retired people);
3. unemployed;
4. illegal immigrants.
The Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT in the following) have de-
veloped a method to estimate the rate of irregular workc(IWR) which is widely
recognized to be in the vanguard. IWR estimates are available both at regional
and national levels, for a time span long enough to allow for an accurate anal-
ysis. Unfortunately estimates are not produced at a smaller territorial level (like
provinces) which would have allowed for a closer examination of the problem.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we review
social capital definitions, the main difficulties related to its measurements and
the solution adopted in this work; in section 3 we present the model used and
the results obtained; in section 4 we move to some conclusions.
2. SOCIAL CAPITAL: DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES
The first glimmer of social capital as a concept dates back to the beginning
of XXth century with the contribution of Hanifan (23; 24) who emphasized the
importance of social structure to people with a business. In the last twenty years
a flourishing multidisciplinary literature on the topic serves to enrich and qualify
the concept of social capital.
There is a widespread agreement among researchers that social capital is
the synthesis of three different point of view (22): the first, due to Putnam et al
(34), defines social capital as those characteristics of social communities, such
as networks of individuals and families together with norms that create externali-
ties for the society as a whole; the second interpretation, referred to by Coleman
(14; 15), defines social capital as a variety of different entities which all consist
of some aspect of social structure and which facilitate certain actions of actors -
whether personal or corporate actors- within the structure; the third is associated
with Olson (33) and North (31) and includes the social and political environment
that shapes social structure and allows for the development of norms.
The OECD and the World Bank define social capital respectively as network,
norms, values and understanding that facilitate co-operation within or among
groups (32) and as institutions, relationships and norms that shape the quality
and quantity of a society’s social interactions (43).
Theoretical research identifies a structural and a cognitive aspect of social
capital, the first being related to actions of individuals and the second to their per-
ception (12; 29; 28). Structural aspects appear in rules and in specific behavior
cIWR is the ratio between the irregular and the total labor units.
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(such as networking or volunteering activities), whereas cognitive aspects ma-
terialize as trust, shared values, empathy and respect towards community. The
former are more easily measured objectively than the latter.
Structural social capital will be different among individuals because it is the
result of individual action; cognitive social capital, on the other hand, will be
homogeneous inside a community since it consists of a person’s attitude and
values.
Another important distinction can be drawn between bonding and bridging
social capital (35): the first refers to the relations that an individual has within
his/her “inner circle” whereas the second relates to ties with people outside the
closest circle but belonging to the same socio-economic group.
This distinction is crucial in our context: if we refer to bonding social capital,
there is vast evidence in the literature that societies wherein family ties are very
strict and important to the culture, tend to have a lower degree of confidence
in public institutions, a lower level of participation and less political involvement.
See for example Fukuyama (20) for an interesting parallelism between Italian
and Chinese society and Alesina-Giuliano (4; 5) for the effect of family ties on
participation.
Therefore, bonding social capital would tend to increase shadow economy
in general and undeclared work in particular. Indeed, if the irregular worker is
a family member, he will not have any incentive to report his irregular position,
because he doesn’t want to hinder the family.
The same is true for any worker who has tight bonds with the employer.
This bonds not necessarily need to be interpreted with a positive meaning: for
example the close network established within a criminal community is a form
of bonding social capital having the effect of increasing the amount of irregular
workers hired. On this behalf, Fukuyama(21) says Many groups achieve internal
cohesion at the expense of outsiders, who can be treated with suspicion, hostil-
ity, or outright hatred. Both the Ku Klux Klan and the Mafia achieve cooperative
ends on the basis of shared norms, and therefore have social capital, but they
also produce abundant negative externalities for the larger society in which they
are embedded.
The effect of bonding social capital is an explanation of the wide-spread pres-
ence of irregular workers in Italian micro and small enterprisesd(10) which are
typically run by a family.
Despite the complexity of the concept of social capital and of its unquestion-
able multidimensionality, a lot of empirical research measures it as a mono di-
mensional phenomenon. This is partly justified by the difficulties of finding data,
especially when analysis spans several years. On this point see the criticisms of
Fine (16; 17), Foley and Edwards (18; 19), Harriss (25).
dThe micro and small firms are those with less that 10 employees.
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In Grootaert-van Bastelaer (22) it is stated that Like human capital, social
capital is difficult, if not impossible, to measure directly; for empirical purposes
the use of proxy indicators is necessary. Years of education and years of work
experience have a long tradition as proxies for human capital and have proven
their value in numerous empirical studies. No such acquired consensus yet ex-
ists for the study of social capital, and the search for the best proxy indicator
continues. The SCIe aimed to make a contribution in this critical area. The mea-
surement challenge is to identify a contextually relevant indicator of social capital
and to establish an empirical correlation with relevant benefit indicators. As the
SCI studies demonstrate, these social capital indicators differ both geographi-
cally and by sector.
The panel nature of the analysis, forced us to put some constraints on data:
first of all, proxy indicators had to be available for the whole period and sec-
ondly they have to be measured homogeneously over time. These requirements
forced us to exclude the European Union Statistics on Income and Living condi-
tions survey (EU-SILC). This data source is quite rich and offers the opportunity
to measure different dimensions of social capital. Unfortunately it begun only in
2004.
Our approach to build a social capital measure, follows Santini (37) who fo-
cuses on the underlying concepts of social capital. These are a) social behav-
ior, b) social relationships, c) social engagement, d) civic responsibility and e)
some territorial characteristics of the Italian regions. These concepts are in turn
components of the two key dimensions of social capital: trust and participation.
Figure represents the conceptual model of social capital whereas the proxy
indicators selected are located in table 1.
The proxy indicators choice, and their relationship with the two main dimen-
sions of social capital (i.e. trust and participation), are based on the following
considerations:
• the variables belonging to social behavior (SB) dimension were selected
because they hinder the devolpment of trust and of a socio-economical
cooperation among members of the regional community;
• for social relationships (SR), one measure of culture has been selected
because cultural events can be an opportunity for the creation of mutual
trust. Lack of SR and of mutual trust is measured by the variable Number
of suicides per 100,000 inhabitants;
• for social engagement, the choice was a variable that measures solidarity.
It is a typical social capital variable, related to participation;
eSCI stands for Social Capital Initiative and is a World Bank network devoted to the study of
social capital.
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Figure 1: Conceptual model of Social capital index
• for civic responsibility, the selected variable (Number of television subscrip-
tions per 100 families) measures the sense of civic duty toward institutions
whereas the Percentage of voters at referendum is a measure of participa-
tion in politics;
• on behalf of the territorial characteristics, since they are significant deter-
minants of social capital formation, a higher urbanization rate should en-
courage social and economic networking while a higher rate of territorial
attraction should be a symptom of greater and better social and economic
opportunities.
As a first step of the social capital index derivation, each region was assigned
a score from 0 to 1 through normalization. The region with the best value (high-
est or lowest, depending on the proxy) were scored 1. Afterward, within each
of the five categories, a synthetic indicator was found by averaging the variables
belonging to that category.
The arithmetic mean was chosen to reflect the interchangeability among the
variables. Finally the five category indexes have been pulled together through
a geometric mean as it implies a lower interchangeability of categories. As a
result of this process there is the overall social capital index.
3. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
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This section contains the econometric model that we used to assess whether
or not social capital has an effect on irregular work rate.
The data used spans from 1998 to 2008 and is measured on the 20 Italian
regions. The dependent variable is (a transformation of) IWR.
Following the literature (1; 2; 3; 11; 13; 30; 8) and imposing the availability of
data for the whole time span, we selected the following independent variables:
unemployment rate, social capital index, capability to export, school drop-out
rate, schooling, capability to innovate, bank credit intensity (Cred).
The UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (UnR) is the percentage of the total labor force
currently unemployed. The labor force is the amount of people belonging to
the subset identified by some age thresholds which vary from country to coun-
try (15 and 65 years in Italy) and who are actively employed or seeking for an
employment. Note that this definition excludes some categories, for example
undergraduate students (because they are not looking for a job) or housewives.
The expected sign of the relation with the irregular work rate is positive; the hy-
pothesis is that the higher the unemployed labor force the bigger the basin to
draw from.
The SOCIAL CAPITAL INDEX (SCI) had been widely discussed in section 2.
As already pointed out, SCI is likely to protect from irregularity and therefore the
expected sign is negative.
The CAPABILITY TO EXPORT (Exp) is the value of exported goods as a per-
centage of gross domestic product (GDP). The expected sign is negative be-
cause firms oriented to foreign markets tend to be of bigger dimension and with
a more efficient and complex structure; this inhibit the use of irregular workers.
SCHOOL DROP-OUT RATE (Drop) is the percentage of students who drop out
school at the end of compulsory education (in Italy they have to be at least 15
years old). The sign is expected to be positive since very low skilled young
people don’t have many chances to get a good job.
SCHOOLING (school) is the number of students enrolled in upper secondary
education out of the 14-18 years old population. Results is expressed in percent-
age. Expected sign is negative for the same reasons expressed in the previous
point.
The CAPABILITY TO INNOVATE (Innov) is measured as the amount of ex-
penses in research and development by private and public firms as a % of GDP.
The expected sign is negative because innovation requires highly specialized
labor which is very difficult to hire irregularly.
The BANK CREDIT INTENSITY (Cred) is the domestic credit (bank loans) pro-
vided by banking sector as a % of GDP. The sign is expected to be negative
because an uneasy (and/or costly) access to credit may postpone investments
and drag firms in marginal positions increasing the risk of irregularity.
A panel dataset consists of variables measured over time on the same units.
The blend of inter-individual differences and intra-individual dynamics, provide
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several advantages over cross-sectional or time-series data. The most impor-
tant are: a) inferences of model parameters are more accurate. This is be-
cause, panel data have more degrees of freedom and more sample variability
than cross-sectional data, enhancing the efficiency of statistical estimates; b)
one can control for the impact of omitted variables. It is argued that the reason
for finding (or not finding) certain effects is due to the omittance of variables in
the model; when the omitted variables are correlated with the included explana-
tory variables, a bias arise. Panel data, containing information on both the inter
temporal dynamics and the individuality of the units, allow to control the effects
of omitted variables;
We will start with some preliminary results that will be helpful in model spec-
ification.
Our analysis starts exploring the behavior of irregular work rate among re-
gions and over time. Table 2 reports the results of statistical tests that help eval-
uate the first aspect. It is evident that Italian regions have very different levels of
irregularity.
Moreover post hoc tests, performed to verify means equality, showed that the
average level of irregularity among regions is very different.
Figure 2 shows the box plots IWR for the 20 Italian regions, grouped by
macro geographical areas. Once again, it’s evident the heterogeneity of IWR
distribution over regions.
These preliminary results clearly state that, whatever the model is, it has
to take into account the specific regional effect on undeclared work. This is
a well known approach and the literature on the topic measures the effects of
socio-economic variables on regional irregular work using fixed effect models. A
broader discussion on this point will follow up ahead in this section.
The main innovation of our contribution in model specification is that we use
a dynamic panel rather than a static one.
Time plots in figure 3 show IWR dynamics and help out to understand this
choice. Apart from a sudden decrease occurred around year 2001f, lines are
quite flat showing that IWR is a time-persistent phenomenon.
Therefore, the best way to model such behavior is through an autoregressive
panel model.
Model specification is:
ln
IWRit
100− IRWit = IWR
′
it =
∑
h
φhIWR
′
i(t−h) +
q∑
k=1
βkXi(t−k+1) + νit (1)
fThis turning point is the effect of two amnesties on irregular immigrants: all at a sudden, a
huge amount of irregular workers (the illegal immigrants) are declared and hired with a regular
position.
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Figure 2: Box plot of IWR by regions.
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Figure 3: Undeclared work rate for Italian regions. Panels group regions belong-
ing to the same geographical area; each line represents a regional time series.
Years 1998-2008.
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Where i = 1, 2, . . . , 20 and t = 1, 2, . . . , 11 are, respectively, regions and time
indicators.
In the right end side of 1, the error term can be written as: νit = µi + it
where:
• µi is an unobserved and time-invariant variable, which differs among re-
gions and captures the individual effect;
• it is an unobserved time and individual variant variable, often referred as
idiosyncratic error.
Another important issues to discuss is whether the individual effects µi are
correlated to (some) explanatory variables X. If this is the case, then a fixed
effect model is the appropriate choice. Otherwise, if correlation is absent, the
best choice is a random effect model.
Due to the differences in the economic structure and on the culture of Italian
regions it is much more likely to think of a correlation between µi and X. Fur-
thermore, since we are inferring on regions, which cannot be considered as a
random draw from a population, but are “one of a kind”, then the choice has to
be on a fixed effect model.
Several problems may arise from estimating model 1: 1) some regressors
X might be endogenous (unemployment rate) because causality is very likely to
run in both directions; 2) as we said, there is a problem of correlation between
the fixed effect and the explanatory variables; 3) lagged dependent variables
give rise to residuals autocorrelation.
To cope with all these problems and to take into account the fact that T = 11
we used the Arellano-Bond estimator (9; 26).
In more details, we used a one-step system GMM estimation method, with
small-sample adjustment. To avoid that heteroskedasticity might affect standard
errors estimates, we used a robust estimation method for the covariance matrix.
Model estimations were done using the command xtabond2 in STATA 11 (36).
Model results are given in table 3.
Results clearly show that: a) irregularity in work is a persistent phenomenon
as it emerges from the fact that lags of order 1 and 2 are both significant and
the IWRt−1 coefficient is the highest among all estimated coefficients; b) social
capital has a protection effect meaning that the more a region is organized under
a social point of view and the deeper is the social responsibility and engagement
among inhabitants, the lower is the propensity to hire irregular workers; c) un-
employment favors irregularity; d) when model specification is dynamic, almost
all of the variables listed at the beginning of this section are not significant.
Two major concerns arose with the estimated model: the first one refers to
the possibility to have found an effect because social capital index include crime
related variables and crime is strongly spread out in those regions where labor
irregularity is high; the second concern is that the panel might have an unit root.
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The first problem was tackled by checking model robustness to the definition
of social capital index. To be more precise, we excluded the crime-related vari-
ables (i.e. Violent crime, Criminality risk perception, Criminal association, Mafia
association) from SCI and used them as a control.
After rerunning the estimates, we found again that social capital has a sig-
nificant effect of protection (its estimated coefficient was -0.711), whereas crime
hasn’t.
To cope with the second problem, we checked if the Arellano-Bond estimated
coefficient for IWRt−1 was included between the OLS and the static panel fixed
effect estimates. Since it wasg, we excluded the existence of an unit root.
4. CONCLUSIONS
There is a widespread evidence that tax evasion cannot be entirely reduced
by deterrence. Instead there are many other factors that explain tax compliance.
We investigated the effect of social capital on a particular form of tax evasion:
i.e. the one that allows employers to cut costs by hiding the true amount of gross
wages due to employee and avoid the withold of social security contributions.
We found a strong evidence that social capital prevents irregular work in the
Italian regions. Like any forms of capital, social capital has to be fostered so
as to offset depraciation: in particular we believe that its benefic effect relies on
the stigmatization of deviant behavior inside a community with strong networking
and structured norms. This mean that a country which is experiencing an impov-
erishment in morality will suffer, among others, of an increase of irregular work.
In a recession period, like the one which is anguishing all developed economies,
it can accelerate the vicious circle tax rise-recession-tax evasion-public deficit
increase-tax rise.
As a consequence, it is of dramatic importance that policy makers are con-
scious of the beneficial effects of social capital and invest in favouring public
confidence and social integration accordingly.
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Table 1: Sub-dimensions of social capital and proxy indicators selected
Social behavior
Violent crime (number of crimes per 10,000 inhabitants)a
Criminality risk perception (rate of families perceiving criminality risk
strongly or very strongly)a
Common crime (as a % of all crimes)a
Number of protests per 10,000 inhabitantsa
Number of fraud per 10,000 inhabitantsa
Criminal association (number of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants)a
Mafia association (number of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants)a
Social engagement
Percentage of voluntary workers (at least 14 years old) in non-profit
institutionsa
Social relationships
Number of tickets sold for music and theater representations per 100
inhabitantsa
Number of suicides per 100,000 inhabitantsa
Civic responsibility
Number of television subscriptions per 100 familiesa
Percentage of voters at referendumb
Territorial characteristics
Percentage of resident population that moved out the regiona
Percentage of resident population that moved in the regiona
Resident population in the regional capital/resident population outside
the regional capitala
Data
sources: a ISTAT; b Home Office;
Table 2: Results of some statistical tests on regional IWR behavior
Value of the
Test Type test statistic p-value H0
Kruskal-Wallis χ2 232.119 0.000 Me1=Me2= . . . = Me20
Levene Fisher’s F 11.419 0.000 σ21 = σ
2
2 = . . . = σ
2
20
17
Table 3: Results of the Arellano-Bond estimator for the dynamic panel model
IWR′ Coef. Std. Err. t P > t [95% C.I.]
IWR′t−1 0.961 0.055 17.400 0.000 0.845 1.077
IWR′t−2 -0.247 0.058 -4.280 0.000 -0.368 -0.127
UnRt−1 0.014 0.004 3.550 0.002 0.006 0.022
SCIt -0.640 0.225 -2.850 0.010 -1.110 -0.170
cons -0.373 0.126 -2.970 0.008 -0.636 -0.111
Instruments for first differences equation
GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed)
(IWRt−1 IWRt−2SCIt UnRt−1) collapsed
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = −3.36 Pr > z = 0.001
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = −0.17 Pr > z = 0.866
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: χ27 = 10.56 Prob > χ
2 = 0.159
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: χ27 = 6.22 Prob > χ
2 = 0.514
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
GMM instruments for levels
Hansen test excluding group: χ23 = 4.63 Prob > χ
2 = 0.201
Difference (null H = exogenous): χ24 = 1.59 Prob > χ
2 = 0.811
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